

H. G. Wells on the Place of Religion in Modern Life

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A Paper Delivered at the Stone-Campbell Journal Annual Conference, April 13, 2024

Introduction

Essayist H. G. Wells was studied in earlier generations mainly for his works of fiction, and particularly those written early in his career. In recent years the non-fiction works of Wells have begun to be taken more seriously as subjects for scholarly analysis. The consensus seems to be that his early fiction (especially from the 1890s), for which he is most famous, was his strongest work. However, his latter works as a social commentator can serve as windows on Edwardian religion and politics and are enlightening. One recent account treated the struggle of contemporary scholarship to place Wells in the specialized disciplinary grid of current academia. “Wells was unique as a public voice, but he could occupy this dynamic, unfixing position of artist, scientific thinker, and general cultural force in part because such a role existed,” this source observes.¹ In reality, he was known as a “Man of Letters,” or in more common parlance a renaissance man or jack of all trades.

My interest centers upon how Wells regarded religion in the context of his reshaping of a republican understanding of modern life and culture. Two texts will enable me to explore Wells and his view of religion, including his descriptions of extant religions, and his promotion of a vision for a future religion. His 1903 treatise *Mankind in the Making* and his 1917 work *God the Invisible King* exhibit his utopian ethos regarding traditional religious beliefs, especially Christianity. **I argue that Wells represents a modern, pragmatic perspective on the analysis of religion’s place in a cultured, modern life that openly sought a selective erosion of traditional religion as a shaping factor in civilization.** Wells engaged in what later generations

would label the work of faith deconstruction as a prelude to his own reconstruction of modern religion.

Wells addresses “the thoughtful reader...whose mind is of the modern cast” on how to regard the past. He declares that “to such a man the whole literature the world produced until the nineteenth century had well progressed, must needs be lacking in any definite and pervading sense of the cardinal importance in the world of this central reproductive aspect.” Echoing the survive and reproduce emphases of Charles Darwin, Wells gave a cultural analysis “of births and of the training and preparation for future births.”²

Making Mankind

A search for the terms “religion” and “religious” in the text of *Mankind in the Making* yields several substantive sections of discussion. The first mention takes the form of an anticipated objection to Wells’ overall project. This hypothetical objector argues that religion already serves the very role that Wells’ system purports to provide. The promoter of religion believes, on Wells’ presentation, “that a properly formulated religion does supply a trustworthy guide at every fork and labyrinth in life.” To this assumption, Wells offers several objections. In the first place, he holds that religion cannot answer every eventuality. It allows too much latitude to private judgment. Secondly, religions are highly prescriptive in some areas but not in others. The religions vary in their definitions of terms and therefore clash. “But on a thousand questions of public importance,” Wells complains, religion is unhelpful. These questions include matters of government, social life, education, trusts, and housing. For such, per Wells, religion “gives by itself no conclusive light.” It leaves the modern person “inconsistent and uncertain amidst these innumerable problems.” Religion may confer personal motivation “to press for clearer light,” but

it “does not give us any decisions.” Modern problems direct the attention outward, while traditional religion is inwardly focused.³

The view Wells held of religious persons was distortive to a high degree. The figures Wells chooses to represent the kind of religion he disavows include: St. Anthony, Durtal, “the pale nun” who prays in vigil, and “the hermit” who “mounts his pillar.”⁴ These are religious persons, to be sure, but ones hardly representative of religious adherence even among the most devout in Great Britain in the year 1903. Indeed, it makes one wonder whether the Christian religion is only represented in Wells’ consciousness by a particularly restrictive form of conservative Catholicism.

Most religions concur that stewardship of the future is indeed a major component of their purpose for existing. For Wells, this responsibility is no longer that of religion, but of a modern elite. “Now a certain number of men are coming to a provisional understanding of some at least of these forces that go to the Making of Man,” Wells notes, nodding to the modern sensibility of the phrase “the self-made man,” and tacitly embracing such a role. He includes himself, unsurprisingly, in this cadre of elite culture-shapers: “To some of us there is being given the privilege and responsibility of knowledge,” he insists.⁵ Sarah Cole has suggested the definition of “modernism” needs to be expanded beyond those who insist moderns stressed “the primacy of subjectivism and the interior life of the mind, indirection and elusiveness,” with “the banishment of political discussion and definitive position-taking . . . and the eschewing of popular appeal.” As these clearly are not adequate descriptions of Wells, and “they are not his creeds,” she suggests that “a more capacious modernism” needs to be recognized, given that Wells is a modernist.⁶

Most scathing of all is Wells in offering a description of the religion of what he conceives to be the typical student of his day. [SUMMARIZE RATHER THAN READING!]

If, too, you ransack your young Englishman for religion, you will be amazed to find scarcely a trace of School. In spite of a ceremonial adhesion to the religion of his fathers, you will find nothing but a profound agnosticism. He has not even the faith to disbelieve. It is not so much that he has not developed religion as that the place has been seared. In his time his boyish heart has had its stirrings, he has responded with the others to “Onward, Christian Soldiers,” the earnest moments of the school pulpit, and all those first vague things. But limited as his reading is, it has not been so limited that he does not know that very grave things have happened in matters of faith, that the doctrinal schemes of the conventional faith are riddled targets, that creed and Bible do not mean what they appear to mean, but something quite different and indefinable, that the bishops, socially so much in evidence, are intellectually in hiding.⁷

Here Wells levels criticisms of the young and their laxity in religion that sound like the critiques Bishops of the Church of England offer as well. While some clergy doubtless held, as charged, a merely surface religion, most in that profession would demur at the notion that a mere nominal religion is desirable. While the bishops would be stung by the criticism that they were “intellectually in hiding,” educators of the clergy are known widely to voice the same lament.⁸

Biographer Sarah Cole notes, “A reader of today is likely to be taken aback by the specificity and detail with which Wells attempts to answer a hundred questions about birth, child-rearing, education, and the polity.” In assessing his mentality in authoring *Mankind*, she writes, “One senses that Wells is enjoying himself, down in the muck and mud of so many ‘definite proposals,’ airing his interests around seemingly limitless features of individual and social welfare.”⁹ Within a few years, Wells moves beyond the mere criticism of existing religion and toward detailing the creation of a new religion as its alternative.

The Invisible King and the New Religion

By 1917, Wells is prepared to specify those aspects of religion that most offend modernist sensibilities. With his publication of *God the Invisible King*, he treats the following themes: cosmogony of modern religion, heresies, the religion of atheists, the invisible king, modern ideas of sin and damnation, and the idea of a church.

Wells wastes no time in elevating Arianism and denigrating trinitarianism in his promotion of a new, modern religion. Arianism is the fourth-century heresy, rejected by the vast majority of bishops gathered in council, that Christ was an exalted creature rather than fully divine. By contrast with dogmas derived from Nicea, Wells begins laying out the foundational tenets of the modern religion he espouses. He uses the method borrowed, ironically, from apophatic theology, i.e., stating what one believes “is not” before attempting to make a positive statement of what “is.” The list of his beliefs (or unbeliefs), is as follows:

Modern Religion has no Founder

Modern Religion has a Finite God

The Infinite Being is not God

The Life Force is not God

God is Within

The modern religion of Wells appears to be a species of agnosticism. “The Veiled Being,” as Wells labels this ineffable entity, “enigmatical and incomprehensible,” and one which “broods over the mirror upon which the busy shapes of life are moving. It is as if it waited in a great stillness. Our lives do not deal with it, and cannot deal with it. It may be that they may never be able to deal with it.”¹⁰ The use of “may be” renders this position a soft agnosticism that leaves the door slightly ajar for a possible, while uncertain, divine-human encounter one day.

Wells next drives a wedge between the “God” of modern religion and “the Ultimate Being” of traditional Christianity. “Human analysis probing with philosophy and science towards the Veiled Being reveals nothing of God,” Wells declares. Investigation of nature via science “reveals space and time only as necessary forms of consciousness, glimpses a dance of atoms, of whirls in the ether.” Yet in labeling modern religion as “our God, the Captain of Mankind,” he holds forth the small possibility that modern religion might be able to introduce mankind to this “ultimate Being.”¹¹

Wells nods to both Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) in his discussion of “the Life Force, the Will to Live, the Struggle for Existence” and even “Mother Nature.”¹² The terms “will” and “struggle” echo Nietzsche. His allusion to Bergson emerges in his employment of the term Bergson coined, in the French, *élan vital*, but by its English translation as “life force.” Where Wells differs from Bergson is on the question of the ultimacy of this life force; for Wells, it is merely penultimate, or the means to a greater end. The life force offers “no certainty and no coherence within us, until we find God.” Wells alludes to Christian scriptures as he closes this section and prepares for the next: “And God comes to us neither out of the stars nor out of the pride of life, but as a still small voice within.”¹³ [SKIP NEXT PAR.]

Bergson’s views were heavily debated in the second decade of the twentieth century. The discussions of evolution had shifted from the truth or falsity of evolution to whether it had any purpose, goal, or direction. Sheer Darwinism denied that there was any purpose or teleology in evolution; randomness was an essential component of Darwin’s view. Both theists and non-theists of an idealistic bent argued that humanity was the goal of evolution. Theistic evolutionists held that evolution was God’s divine method of bringing about human life and flourishing. Non-theistic versions of this approach stressed the built-in character of purpose within nature, without

specifying a divine origin for it. Historian of science Peter Bowler notes that: “Twentieth-century biologists were deeply influenced by these ideas, especially those of Bergson, and thus continued to support theories in which evolution is pushed forward by a general progressive force somehow linked to the expansion of mental powers.” Yet the question of the place of the mental in the system was rigorously contested. For instance, was mind always embedded in nature, or did mind emerge “at a key point in the ascent of life”?¹⁴ Regardless of the answer to this ancillary question, Bergson was notable for his “revolt against materialism” and “efforts to overcome the resistance to brute matter,” and his reopening of the door to “a reconfiguration of the argument from design.” For Bergson, the divine only operated at the point of origins; he rejected the notion of intervention to produce human consciousness. He therefore stressed a continuity of the life force allowing “the details to be worked out in the course of history in order to leave room for free will in the highest products of the trend.”¹⁵

Wells moves the argument into a defense of immanentism. This was a popular form of belief inherited from the 19th century. A reaction both to Deism and to the Protestant Scholastic Theology of the 17th and 18th centuries, immanentism swung the theological pendulum away from God’s transcendence, and toward God’s identification with the material world. Owing much to G. F. W. Hegel (1770-1831) in philosophy and history, as well as to Friedrich Schleiermacher’s (1768-1834) naming of “The Absolute” in theology, immanentism was a way of modifying religion in a more anthropocentric direction.¹⁶

We see in Wells something of a popularization of Hegel’s *Geist*. Yet this version of the world spirit, far from subsisting as a mere impersonal force, was a somewhat friendlier, humanized version. Wells wrote of this being, using the personal pronoun:

He works in men and through men. He is a spirit, a single spirit and a single person; he has begun and he will never end. He is the immortal part and leader of

mankind. He has motives, he has characteristics, he has an aim. He is by our poor scales of measurement boundless love, boundless courage, boundless generosity. He is thought and a steadfast will. He is our friend and brother and the light of the world. That briefly is the belief of the modern mind with regard to God.¹⁷

The only novelty Wells claims for this view is that this God is *finite*; i.e., has a beginning, and is thus not the *eternal*, uncreated being of orthodox Christian theology.¹⁸ Modern religion, on this view, is so firmly implanted within modern humans that it appeals to no revelation, no scripture, no authority. It sees beyond the depictions of God as Good Shepherd, or as Father, Son, or Holy Ghost. Wells portrays Christian teachings so as to claim that traditional Christianity “. . . had been hypnotised and obsessed by the idea that the Christian God is the only thinkable God. They had heard so much about that God and so little of any other. With that release their minds become, as it were, nascent and ready for the coming of God.”¹⁹ Deconstruction and reconstruction emerge yet again.

Still, the description Wells offers of his immanentist deity still bears hallmarks of the Christian influence. Wells emphasizes a closeness bordering on intimacy: “It is as if this being bridged a thousand misunderstandings and brought us into fellowship with a great multitude of other people. . . . ‘Closer he is than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet,’” he intones.²⁰

Wells offers a chapter on heresies, which, from an orthodox perspective, issues in shock after shock. Under speculative heresies, Wells attacks the doctrine of the trinity (again), and errantly claims the Apostles’ Creed to be a fourth-century invention. Under the heresy that God is magic, he labels “fetishistic” the idea of many ordinary Christians that God routinely blesses or punishes virtue or sin in their turn. To conclude this section, Wells articulates the alternative view of God: “He is not to serve men’s ends or the ends of nations or associations of men; he is careless of our ceremonies and invocations.” On

this point, Wells actually echoes many of the prophets including Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. When Wells urges of the deity that “He does not lose his temper with our follies and weaknesses” his view is again not inimical to an orthodox understanding of divine grace and mercy. God’s wrath is not, to the theologian, God merely “losing his temper.” When Wells reminds readers: “It is for us to serve Him. He captains us, he does not coddle us,” hardly a pulpit in the land would have objected.²¹

Among the remaining “heresies,” Wells takes issue most strongly with “priestcraft,” which he has discovered inculcating fear of damnation in children who do not confess their sins, as early as age six, to the local priest. As an outspoken free-love advocate who lives in an open marriage, he also seeks to debunk Christian limitations on human sexuality. His strongest words, concluding the chapter, focus on the Catholic vow of clerical celibacy. Labeling the Roman priesthood “sex-tormented,” he condemns “a superstitious abstinence that scars and embitters the mind, distorts the imagination, makes the body gross and keeps it unclean.” Such postures toward human sexuality were, for Wells, “just as offensive to God as any positive depravity.”²² The degree of dismissal would differ, but criticisms of the practice of clerical celibacy could also be found in contemporaneous Protestant apologetics.

Wells offers a stern critique of the Christian theology of the cross and the atonement in ways that echoes Friedrich Nietzsche’s will to power: “We cannot accept the Christian’s crucifix, or pray to a pitiful God. We cannot accept the Resurrection as though it were an after-thought to a bitterly felt death.”²³ Yet Wells here commits, somewhat egregiously, the red herring fallacy. The orthodox believer does not see the

resurrection as an afterthought either. The Apostle Peter proclaimed on Pentecost that this event, i.e., the resurrection, had been prophesied by King David centuries before.

As of the writing of *God the Invisible King*, Wells still has a place for the idea of a kingdom, even one with spiritual implications. However, these are primarily mediated through culture-creating activities. Those who promote such a kingdom engage in “. . . doing or sustaining scientific research or education or creative art; they are making roads to bring men together, they are doctors working for the world’s health, they are building homes, they are constructing machinery to save and increase the powers of men. . . .”²⁴ Here too, Wells articulates a perspective, known as the cultural mandate, that was already being promoted with equal vigor by his European contemporary Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), a staunchly evangelical Christian politician and erstwhile Prime Minister from Holland.²⁵

Some of his antipathy toward Christianity can be traced to childhood experience. Per one biographer, at age 17, Wells had the opportunity to teach at Midhurst Grammar School. While excited about the opportunity, he protested against the requirement for employment to be a member of the Church of England. He finally agreed to “pretend to accept what he did not believe,” both to appease the school and his mother. Yet as one biographer notes: “He retained a sense of resentment and distrust of the Church throughout his life.”²⁶

In *God the Invisible King* he calls out as rank and unprincipled hypocrisy the liberalism of the Protestant clergy: “They have adopted compromises, they have qualified their creeds with modifying footnotes of essential repudiation; they have decided that plain statements are metaphors and have undercut, transposed, and inverted the most vital

points of the vulgarly accepted beliefs.” Such religious leaders are actually modern; but for Wells, they are not openly and honestly modern in their outlook. Targeting the broad church tolerance of the Church of England, he pointedly claims: “One may find within the Anglican communion, Arians, Unitarians, Atheists, disbelievers in immortality, attenuators of miracles; there is scarcely a doubt or a cavil that has not found a lodgment within the ample charity of the English Establishment.”²⁷

When he analyzes the classic doctrines of sin and damnation, Wells takes the path of reductionism. He reduces sin to biological disharmonies in nature. Damnation is the description of the present discomforts caused by these disharmonies. These recalibrations in turn call for a redefinition of the notion of salvation. “Salvation for the individual is escape from the individual distress at disharmony and the individual defeat by death, into the Kingdom of God. And damnation can be nothing more and nothing less than the failure or inability or disinclination to make that escape.” *Ergo*, humans standing satisfied with disharmonies rather than joining God in opposing them, is Wells’ version of damnation. For Wells sin is an “incidental separation from God.” It need not bring damnation. Yet he does still see sin as a problem, under softening terms such as “losing touch with God” or yielding to a “base instinct.” Such are “rebel forces of our ill-coordinated selves.” Wells sounds at times like a standard Christian manual of spiritual direction. “This is the personal problem of Sin. Here prayer avails; here God can help us,” Wells assures his readers. “From God comes the power to anticipate the struggle with one’s rebel self, and to resist and prevail over it.”²⁸

In his chapter on the church, as the reader might surmise, a dramatic redefinition again occurs. Here the adherent of modern religion abandons doctrines such as trinity,

omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience. The subtext of H. G. Wells' argument is the goal of liberation: "Almost unconsciously the new thought is taking a course that will lead it far away from the moorings of Omnipotence. It is like a ship that has slipped its anchors and drifts, still sleeping, under the pale and vanishing stars, out to the open sea," he assures his readers.²⁹

Wells turns his attention to eastern religions as the repository of tenets to form alternatives to the fundamentals of the Christian creeds. Wells identifies modernizing trends in various traditional religions, including Islam. He foresees a convergence of all religions into one modern religion that has dispensed with ". . . the old priesthoods and tabernacles and symbols and shrines . . ." as such artifacts are swept away by one rising tide of new ideas, i.e., this new modern religion espoused by H. G. Wells.³⁰

In his criticism of rites, rituals, creeds, and sacerdotal trappings, Wells claims to be allied to Christ himself, who opposed a first-century version of such elements in his own day under the form of his critique of Pharisaism. God deals directly with the individual, who can repent, rather than the organization or the committee, which never repents.³¹ Modernism more broadly is highly dismissive of the ancient creeds and confessions of Christianity, and Wells is congruent with this trend.

Further reflection leads Wells to a grudging concession regarding some elements of traditional religion having a continuing value. Wells observes: "The writer does not understand this desire or need for collective prayer very well, but there are people who appear to do so and there is no reason why they should not assemble for that purpose." Apart from any guidance of "priestcraft," Wells believes in a cultural renaissance under the modern religion. He looks forward to a "great revival of art, religious art, music,

songs, and writings of all sorts, drama, the making of shrines, praying places, temples and retreats, the creation of pictures and sculptures.”³²

Given the hostility early in *God the Invisible King* to the external features of organization in religion, statements in the concluding section are a source of potential bemusement. “There is a curious modernity about very many of Christ’s recorded sayings,” Wells urges. Rejecting positivism as a viable alternative, given its spiritual poverty, Wells returns to a familiar well: “Religion, thus restated, must, I think, presently incorporate great sections of thought that are still attached to formal Christianity.”³³

In his 1934 autobiography, Wells looks back on this period of his writing with a degree of chagrin. When discussing his life from 1914-1916, Wells seeks to explain why God came into his books and essays. “I went to considerable lengths with this attempt to deify human courage,” he concedes. The Great War shook core beliefs about human goodness and the possibility of a better world order. He briefly joined “the numbers of fine-minded people who were still clinging not so much to religion as to the comfort of religious habits and phrases.” This betook of “some lingering quality of childish dependence in them” that also “answered to this lapse toward a ‘sustaining faith’ in myself,” he admitted. He retrospectively calls this moment “. . . a falling back of the mind toward immaturity under the stress of dismay and anxiety.” He protests that: “At no time did my deistic phrasing make any concessions to doctrinal Christianity.” He pleads that his hands have been unsoiled by compromise with “organized orthodoxy.” His ensuing books would distance his view of God even further from the Anglican faith. Instead Wells conceives of his view of religion as “this new personification of human progressiveness,” and a “deified humanism.”³⁴

Conclusion:

Many versions of an irreligious religion, or a material spirituality, can be adduced across history. Persecution by an official orthodoxy is the usual modern explanation of the demise of these alternatives. Yet the pervasive internal incoherence endemic to such movements is at least as viable in explaining their demise. As with all utopias, his views collapse on the assumption of the innate, inherent, and sincere goodness and fairness of human persons. Furthermore, it is an idyllic that any religion will persuade others of its veracity without a clear articulation of its core beliefs (creed), or without a clearly organized structure for its conservation and growth (church).

One biographer notes that Wells moved beyond a rigid secularism by the end of the nineteenth century. “While keeping his distance from religious commitment,” on this account, Wells “consistently made use of Christian imagery and ideas in his work, generally ironically, but sometimes less so.” In this he “retained his mother’s assumption that there was a single body of truth, belief in which could lead to something like salvation.” Indeed, this reading of Wells goes so far as to admit: “Wells’s faith was essentially a Protestantism so diluted that only the faintest trace of belief remained.”³⁵ More broadly, this reflected an oft-noted tension between realism and idealism in his earlier fiction. The naturalism Wells inherited from his teacher and mentor, Darwinian biologist T. H. Huxley, led to naturalistic threads portraying life as “. . . squalid and meaningless, with human beings little more than the victims of heredity and environment (the kind of fiction one might expect a convinced Darwinian to write).” Yet in tension with this, as we have seen in this paper, arises a recurrence of “a militant fantasy. . . with its roots in Wells’s religious upbringing and his own experience of self-transformation.”³⁶

Had orthodox Christology failed in the fourth century, and Nicea lost the battle of ideas, from what system would Wells then have borrowed so many of the elements of his so-called modern religion? While the answer is probably beyond our ken, we must return to the record Wells bequeathed to future readers. Wells wanted a republican form of government on earth; yet he wistfully maintained, even if only fleetingly, our need for an Invisible King over reality to bring about a desired utopia.

ENDNOTES:

¹ Sarah Cole, *Inventing Tomorrow: H. G. Wells and the Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 14.

² H. G. Wells, *Mankind in the Making*, 2nd ed. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1903), 4.

³ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁶ Cole, 18.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 195.

⁸ At Oxford University in this same period a vigorous debate was occurring over whether to allow Nonconformists, who took a more open view of the theological task, to participate fully in the Faculty of Theology at Oxford, as was increasingly happening at smaller yet prestigious religious schools. See Daniel Inman, *The Making of Modern English Theology: God and the Academy at Oxford, 1833-1945* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014), 197-202.

⁹ Cole, 249.

¹⁰ Wells, *Mankind*, 15.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² The contribution of Nietzsche is the negative, i.e., the removal of the traditional notion of the divine, distinct from the more positive contribution of Bergson to Wells, i.e., the *élan vital* as a quasi-spiritual natural alternative to the divine. On the connection between Bergson and Nietzsche, see Jim Urpeth, "Reviving 'Natural Religion': Nietzsche and Bergson on Religious Life," *Nietzsche and Phenomenology* (2011), 185-205.

¹³ Wells, *Invisible King*, 18; cf. 1 Kings 19:12; 1 John 2:16, KJV.

¹⁴ Peter J. Bowler, *Reconciling Science and Religion: The Debate in Early-Twentieth-Century Britain*, Science and its Conceptual Foundations Series, ed. David L. Hull (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 132.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 136.

¹⁶ David A. Duquette, "Hegel: Social and Political Thought," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, at URL: <https://iep.utm.edu/hegelsoc/#H4>, accessed December 19, 2023; Jan-Olaf Henriksen, "Feeling of Absolute Dependence or Will to Power? Schleiermacher vs. Nietzsche on the conditions for Religious Subjectivity," *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 45 (2003), 317-18.

¹⁷ Wells, *Invisible King*, 18.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

²⁰ Wells, *Invisible King*, 23.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 35.

²² *Ibid.*, 54.

²³ *Ibid.*, 102.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 109.

²⁵ Steve Bishop, "Abraham Kuyper: Cultural Transformer," *Foundations* 79 (2020), 60-76.

²⁶ Claire Tomalin, *The Young H. G. Wells: Changing the World* (New York: Penguin, 2021), 30-31.

²⁷ Wells, *Invisible King*, 129.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 150.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 158.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 162. For more on Wells and his flawed assumptions about the modernization of Islam, see my essay, "The Future in 1916: The Vision of H. G. Wells," online at URL: <https://thenomocracyproject.wordpress.com/2016/01/08/the-future-in-1916-the-vision-of-h-g-wells-by-dennis-l-durst/>, accessed 4/3/2024.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 163-4.

³² *Ibid.*, 169.

³³ *Ibid.*, 174.

³⁴ H. G. Wells, *Experiment in Autobiography: Discoveries and Conclusions of a Very Ordinary Brain (Since 1866)* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), 574-6.

³⁵ Sherborne, 238.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 95; cf. 52.